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NOTES

Bias in Administrative Rulemaking After
Association of National Advertisers v.
Federal Trade Commission*
I. Introduction
Administrators must be silent and impartial when presiding over administrative cases against specific individuals or entities. Bias and prejudgment have
been recognized as sufficient grounds for disqualification of an administrator
from performance in an adjudicative capacity.' Until recently, however, an
agency official, acting as a rulemaker, rather than as an adjudicator, has never
been disqualified on the grounds of bias and prejudgment.
The first disqualification of an administrator for bias in rulemaking occurred recently in Association of National Advertisers v. FTC.2 In April, 1977,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initiated a major trade regulation rulemaking proceeding to consider proposed restrictions on television advertising
directed towards children.' Prior to the initiation of the rulemaking proceedings,
FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk openly described children's television advertising as "unfair and deceptive." 4 Various trade associations and companies
filed a motion in the District Court for the District of Columbia requesting
Pertschuk's disqualification.' The parties asserted that Pertschuk had "prejudged
issues of fact whose resolution would be necessary to a fair determination of the
rulemaking and which would come before him in a quasi-judicial capacity, and
that by his public and private actions Chairman Pertschuk had also created the
appearance of prejudgment and bias." 6 The district court granted the motion,
thus barring Commissioner Pertschuk from participation in the rulemaking
proceedings.! The court's decision to disqualify Chairman Pertschuk established
novel precedent for disqualification for bias in the FTC and other agency rulemaking contexts. The implications of the court's decision, therefore, merit close
consideration.
1 See, e.g., Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); Texaco, Inc. v.
FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
2 1978-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) ff 62,327.
3 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967-72 (1978). Pursuant to § 18 of the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1974, the FTC has the authority to ban unfair or deceptive
advertising. Pub L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976)).
4 The following is an example of one of Chairman Pertschuk's statements as quoted by the
movants in support of their disqualification request: "Cumulatively, commercials directed to
children tend to distort the role of food. 'Consumer, stuff thyself' is the message. Rarely is
there emphasis on good nutrition, or any suggestion that eating too much of any food can be
bad." Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, No. 78-1421 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 1, 1978)
(Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief).
5 Among the movants were the Association of National Advertisers (ANA), Kellogg,
American Association of Advertising Agencies, American Advertising Federation and Toy
Manufacturers of America.
6 1978-2 TRADE CASES at 75,966.
7 An appeal filed by the FTC is presently pending in the Court of Appeals.
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A critical shift in the perception of due process in the administrative rulemaking context has been evidenced by the recent emphasis on participants' right
to a hearing and in the development of hybrid rulemaking procedures. Generally, hybrid rulemaking procedures have authorized the use of more trial-type
hearings in the rulemaking process in order to assure interested parties an opportunity for meaningful participation. The court's primary due process concern in
National Advertisers, however, was not the right to a hearing. Rather, the court
sought to ensure that the rulemaking participants received a fair hearing.' Based
on the evidence presented by the plaintiffs, the court found a substantial showing
that the Chairman's continued participation in the rulemaking would violate the
plaintiffs' due process right to a disinterested objective rulemaking hearing:
There is no reason, given the breadth and nature of the Chairman's preconceptions, to relegate plaintiffs to final appellate review while the Chairman participates in all aspects of the instant rulemaking.

. .

. [The] con-

tinued participation of the Chairman would render the proceedings void
and so irrevocably tainted that any final determination that might flow from
such proceedings would be invalid.9
The right to an objective hearing is essential to fundamental administrative
due process."0 The nature of that right, however, arguably varies according to
the nature of the particular administrative proceeding involved. What constitutes inappropriate bias, therefore, also might vary with the nature of the proceeding. The hybrid rulemaking procedure employed by the FTC in National
Advertisers is a unique combination of elements from both administrative adjudication and administrative rulemaking. The district court stressed the adjudicative nature of the FTC hybrid procedure. To protect the plaintiffs' due
process right to an objective rulemaking hearing, the court imposed the same
standard of neutrality and impartiality on an administrator performing in
hybrid rulemaking proceedings as that imposed on administrative adjudicators."
8 FTC proceedings normally are reviewed in the United States Court of Appeals. 15
U.S.C. § 57a(e) (1976). The general rule is that the district court stay its hand until the
termination of the administrative process. Nader v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 261, 265-68 (D.C. Cir.
1972). A recognized exception to this general rule, however, allows a party to "bypass established avenues for review within the agency . .. where the agency has very clearly violated an
important constitutional or statutory right." Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755, 768 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (quoting Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). The
district court in National Advertisers relied on this exception to justify hearing the plaintiffs'
disqualification claim. 1978-2 TRAD CASES at 75,967.
9 1978-2 TRaDE CASES at 75,967.
10 Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) stands for the proposition that a fair trial in
a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process in administrative agencies as well as in
courts. See Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
11 The test for disqualification for bias in administrative proceedings is whether "a disinterested observer may conclude that [the agency] has in some measure adjudged the facts as well
as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing it." See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC,
267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959). Accord, Cinderella Career
and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In most cases involving bias in adjudicative proceedings, however, this standard seems to have served as merely
conclusory language that is unsupported by specific criteria for determining what type of statements or actions by an agency official may lead a disinterested observer to conclude that the
facts have been prejudged. The courts largely have determined whether bias was inappropriate in the adjudicative context by distinguishing between adjudicative and legislative facts
and between personal and institutional bias. See discussions accompanying notes 57-80 and
notes 81-93 infra.
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Although some aspects of every FTC proceeding are likely to be adjudicative in
nature, hybrid proceedings nonetheless possess important rulemaking characteristics which merit consideration in deciding what standard of impartiality
to impose in such proceedings.
Rulemaking increasingly has been preferred over adjudication as a more
expeditious and flexible mechanism for establishing administrative policy. Effective operation of the administrative system depends largely on the work of
officials "whose broad point of view is in general agreement with the policies
[they administer] but who [maintain] sufficient balance to perceive and to avoid
the degree of zeal which substantially impairs fairness."' Some form of check
on the degree of zeal of rulemakers is necessary to insure an objective rulemaking
hearing. The need to protect against unfairness in rulemaking, however, must
be measured against the competing need for efficiency. A check on the impartiality of rulemakers, therefore, should not unduly restrict expeditious and
flexible rulemaking. Imposing the same standard of impartiality on rulemakers
as is imposed on adjudicators might be such an undue restraint on the effective
operation of the administrative rulemaking process.
In addition to the competing needs for efficiency and fairness, the combination of legislative and adjudicative elements in hybrid rulemaking suggests the
need for a unique approach for determining what constitutes inappropriate bias
in a hybrid rulemaking proceeding. Courts have not addressed the question of
how to balance the competing needs for fairness and efficiency in the hybrid
rulemaking context. The due process right to a fair rulemaking hearing is an
extension of rulemaking participants' basic right to a hearing. An investigation
of how the courts have determined when due process requires an opportunity for
a hearing, therefore, is a logical point of departure from which to consider the
most appropriate framework for analyzing the due process right to a fair hearing
in the hybrid context. Consideration of how the courts have determined what
constitutes inappropriate bias in administrative adjudications also seems necessary to the development of an approach to the bias problem in rulemaking.
Accordingly, this note examines three possible theories for determining when
alleged bias is a sufficient ground for disqualification in the unique hybrid rulemaking context. The first theory, which has been employed to determine whether
to afford rulemaking participants an opportunity for a hearing, distinguishes
between adjudicative and legislative facts. According to this theory, only bias as
to adjudicative facts merits disqualification. The second theory, which has been
employed to determine whether to disqualify an administrator for bias in an
adjudicative proceeding, distinguishes between institutional and personal bias
such that only a display of personal bias merits disqualification. Rather than
relying on arbitrary distinctions, the third theory examined in this note focuses
on the nature of the particular interests involved in the rulemaking proceeding.
According to this theory, the decision whether to disqualify is thus made on a
case-by-case basis. This theory provides a more flexible and pragmatic approach
to a charge of bias in hybrid rulemaking and is thus the preferable approach.
12 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12.01, at 247 (3rd ed. 1970).
ing notes 58-62 inlra.

See text accompany-

NOTES

[Vol. 54:886]

Such flexibility allows consideration of the competing needs for fairness and
efficiency and of the unique combination of legislative and adjudicative elements
in the hybrid rulemaking context.
The hybrid rulemaking procedures employed by the FTC and those employed by other administrative agencies are essentially combinations of the legislative and adjudicative procedure prescribed by the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). A brief discussion of those APA procedures is therefore essential to
the present discussion of bias in the hybrid rulemaking context.
II. The Administrative Procedure Act
The APA prescribes a set of minimum standards for individual agencies in
establishing their own rulemaking mechanisms. 4 The APA provides two alternative procedures for the promulgation of administrative regulations. The first,
commonly known as "notice-and-comment" rulemaking, requires that (1) a
notice of the proposed rule be published; (2) an opportunity be given interested
persons to submit written data, views or arguments; and (3) there be a publication of a concise general statement of the basis and purpose of the promulgated
rule. 5 Notice-and-comment procedures frequently have been characterized as
legislative-type hearings.
The second alternative, commonly known as "on-the-record" or "formal"
rulemaking, requires that (1) there be a "hearing" for the taking of evidence
before the agency or a hearing examiner, and (2) the agency decision be based
on the whole record and be supported by substantial evidence. Every party to a
formal rulemaking proceeding "is entitled to present his case or defense by oral
or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such
cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."' 6
Accordingly, "formal" or "on-the-record" procedures frequently have been
characterized as "trial-type" hearings.
Under the APA, agencies, in their discretion, may attach some, or even all,
the attributes of a trial-type hearing to notice-and-comment rulemaking. In addition, if the agency chooses, it may conduct informal hearings with or without
a stenographic transcript, conferences, and consultations with committees representing interested individuals or groups.' Likewise, the agency is authorized to
substitute the submission of all or part of the evidence in written form for the
oral submission of the evidence in formal rulemaking, depending on what is required to elicit truth and understanding in the particular situation.'" Agencies
which have developed hybrid rulemaking procedures have taken full advantage
of the wide latitude afforded them by the APA. In order to afford rulemaking
participants an opportunity for more meaningful participation, these agencies
13

14

5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554 (1970).
S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., ist Sess. (1945),

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,

reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 200 (1946).

15
16

5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1970).

17

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ACT 29, 31 (1949).

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-

CEDURE

18

OF

5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
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have expanded the APA notice-and-comment procedures to include the use of
more trial-type hearings.
III. Assuring Fairness: Development of Hybrid Rulemaking
Extensive use of APA formal or trial-type hearings has been considered by
most as inappropriate and burdensome for the agency rulemaking function. 9
In addition, the APA notice-and-comment procedure, which has been the preferred administrative rulemaking form, increasingly has been deemed inadequate.2" To insure fairness to interested parties while avoiding the imposition of
undue formality, agencies, Congress, and the courts increasingly have chosen to
allow hybrid rulemaking procedures. The typical approach has been to complement notice-and-comment rulemaking, in varying degrees, with additional procedural requirements such as oral argument, agency consultations with advisory
committees and even, in some instances, trial-type cross-examination and rebuttal.
Judge Levanthal foreshadowed this proceduralization of informal administrative rulemaking in American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, when
he expressly recognized that "there may be wisdom in providing for oral testimony, at least in legislative-type hearings, in advance of the adoption of controversial regulations governing competitive practices."2 1 He also revealed a
"readiness to lay down procedural requirements deemed inherent in the very
concept of fair hearing for certain classes of cases ... ""
The District of Columbia Circuit followed Judge Levanthal's suggestion in
Mobil Oil Corp. v. FederalPower Commission," in which Mobil Oil challenged
the procedure by which the Federal Power Commission (FPC) set minimum
rates required to be charged by natural gas pipelines for the transportation of
certain liquid and liquefiable hydrocarbons. Mobil asserted that the Commission
was required to use formal rulemaking procedures as prescribed by the APA."4
The FPC maintained, however, that the pure APA notice-and-comment procedures were sufficient.
Contrary to the contentions of the opposing parties, the court of appeals
interpreted the APA as allowing rulemaking procedures between the two extremes. In support of this interpretation, the court cited several cases in which
courts have approved or required procedures that contained elements of both

19 The Administrative Conference has recommended that "Congress ordinarily should not
impose mandatory procedural requirements other than those required by § 553, except . . .
when it has special reason to do so." ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, RECOMMENDATION 75-5(2), at 66 (1970-72). See also

Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 311-12
(1978).
20 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 19; Verkuil, supra
note 19; Kastenbaum, Rulemaking Beyond APA: Criteria for Trial-Type Procedures and the
FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 679, 690 (1976).
21 359 F.2d 624, 631 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
22 Id. at 632.
23 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

24

5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556. 557 (1970).
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APA formal and informal procedures.25 Accordingly, the court refused to force
the problem into "artificial cubbyholes" of "formal" versus "informal" proceedings merely to adhere strictly to APA procedural guidelines. In the court's opinion, the explicit dictates of the APA were not "the primary test for appropriateness of a particular type of procedure."2 Rather, the court announced that the
procedures should have been "realistically tailor[ed] ...to fit the issues before it,
the formation it need[ed] to illuminate those issues and the manner of presentation....-"
The judicial trend toward proceduralization of administrative rulemaking
has been paralleled by legislative action in numerous statutes prescribing hybrid
rulemaking procedures. Examples of such statutes are the Consumer Product
Safety Act of 1972,28 the Securities Act of 1975,2' and the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975.30 These statutes require, in
part, that all interested persons be given an opportunity for oral presentation of
data, views and arguments.
The primary purposes of the additional procedural requirements imposed by
these recent statutes are (1) to provide adequate means for interested persons
to participate in the proceedings, either directly or indirectly; (2) to supplement
the agency's information and views, possessed by virtue of its specialized knowledge and prior inquiries, with other relevant information and views; (3) to
provide an auditory process through which participants can test the soundness
of material introduced; and (4) to maintain the loyalty of administrators and
insure that their actions are rationally based and within the scope of their
authority.31
The Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975 (FTCIA) well
illustrates how hybrid rulemaking procedures are designed to effect those purposes. As is true of other hybrid rulemaking statutes, Congress prescribed procedures that would encourage participation in FTC rulemaking by those knowledgeable in the disputed matters to aid the Commission in its determination of
appropriate rules:
It was the judgment of the Conferees that more effective, workable and
25 International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); City of
Chicago v. Federal Power Comnm'n, 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1074 (1972); American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
26 483 F.2d at 1252. Accord, 458 F.2d 731.

27

483 F.2d at 1252 (quoting 458 F.2d at 744).

28 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1976).
29 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a-b (1976). Other recent statutes which impose additional procedural
requirements in administrative rulemaking include the following:
(1)
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §. 801 (1970).
(2)
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
(3)
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a, 1857g(a), 1857h

(1970).
(4)
(5)
(6)

The Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031, 1034 (1970).
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1976).
Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101-7352

(1977).
31 Fuchs, Development and Diversification in Administrative Rulemaking, 72 Nw. L. REv.
83, 105 (1977). See also Nelson, The Politicization of FTC Rulemaking, 8 CONN. L. Rv.
413, 430-31 (1976).
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meaningful rules will be promulgated if persons affected by such rules have
the opportunity afforded by the bill, by cross-examination and rebuttal
evidence or other submissions, to challenge the factual assumptions on
which the Commission is 32proceeding and to show in what respect such
assumptions are erroneous.
As prescribed by the FTCIA, the FTC must publish notice of proposed rulemaking, stating with particularity the reason for the proposed rule. 3 In addition
to affording an opportunity for interested persons to comment through written
views and arguments, the Commission must publish comments received and subsequent remarks made with respect to those comments. 4 The FTCIA further
requires that interested persons be afforded the opportunity for an "informal
hearing" as the Commission may deem appropriate," and that a verbatim transcript of informal hearings be maintained and made available to the public.3 6
Finally, the FTC must promulgate, if appropriate, a final rule based on the matter in the rulemaking record together with a statement of the basis and purpose
for the rule.37
The "informal hearing" referred to in the FTCIA differs from the APA
informal, notice-and-comment procedure. In the informal FTC rulemaking
hearing, interested persons are entitled to present their position orally or by
documentary submissions, or both. Additionally, if the Commission determines
that there are "disputed issues of material fact"3 " necessary for resolution, the
parties are entitled to present rebuttal submissions and to conduct such crossexamination as the Commission determines to be appropriate and necessary for
full and true disclosure with respect to such disputed issues. "9
IV. Due Process in Administrative Law
As demonstrated in the previous discussion, recent judicial and statutory
mandates to utilize more trial-type hearings than are prescribed by the APA
evince a critical shift in the perception of administrative due process and in the
court's role in assuring it. Similarly, in National Advertisers, the district court
sought to protect the due process rights of the rulemaking participants. The
court's primary due process concern, however, was not to ensure full and fair
disclosure or to afford an adequate opportunity to be heard. The court was concerned with bias and prejudgment as a potential form of unfairness:
[A]n administrative hearing must be attended
of fairness, but with the very appearance of
parties to this proceeding are as a matter
entitled to a final rulemaking decision that

not only with every element
complete fairness. . . . The
of fundamental due process
will be premised on factual

33
34

REPORT No. 93-1408, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S.
NEws 7755, 7765.
15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(1) (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (2) (1976).

35

15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(3) (1976).

32

CONFERENCE

CODE CONG.

& AD.

36 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (4) (1976).
37 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a(1)(B), 57a(d)(1) (1976).
38 The rule explaining the FTCIA characterizes disputed issues of material fact as "issues
of specific, in contrast to legislative fact." 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(d) (5) (i) (A) (1977).
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a(c) (1) (1976). The Commission is granted sole discretion to determine what the disputed issues are and the extent of cross-examination which will be allowed.
See 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(c) (1) (i) - (ix) (1977).
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determinations which have not been prejudged in advance or tainted by
40
the participation of one whose objectivity is subject to serious question.

The propriety of and justification for removal of a biased agency rulemaker have
received little attention in judicial opinions and legal literature. An approach
specifically for determining when due process requires disqualification of a rulemaker for bias and prejudgment has not been developed. The right to a fair
rulemaking hearing is an apparent extension of the participants' due process
right to an opportunity to be heard. A discussion of the approach courts have
taken to determine whether to afford rulemaking participants the opportunity
for a hearing is appropriate in the search for the proper approach to the bias
problem in the hybrid rulemaking context.
A. Adjudication versus Rulemaking
Initially, the adjudication rulemaking distinction seemed an appropriate
basis for the determination whether to afford parties involved in agency proceedings an opportunity for a hearing. As a practical matter, whether an agency
was engaged in rulemaking or adjudication turned on whether the action was
general in application or whether it applied to particular named parties. Rulemaking involved the adoption of rules concerning a general topic or group of
persons and was premised on policy grounds or judgments and not on the evaluation of facts peculiar to affected individuals. Adjudication, on the other hand,
typically was considered as dealing with the resolution of individual matters on
the basis of facts pertinent to the parties involved.
Two early and related cases illustrate how this very fundamental distinction
between rulemaking and adjudication led to the conclusion that trial-type
hearings were inappropriate for resolution of factual disputes in rulemaking but
were appropriate for resolution of factual disputes in adjudication.
In Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado,41 the administrative action at issue was an
across-the-board increase in Denver land valuations for state tax purposes. The
United States Supreme Court held that there was no due process right to a hearing for individuals affected by legislative-type administrative action. The Court
emphasized that the state agency's action was in the nature of a general rule
"in which all were equally concerned."42 In contrast, Londoner v. Denver43
involved proceedings for the assessment of street-paving costs for Denver property
owners. The Supreme Court ruled that the property owners were entitled to a
hearing before they could be assessed.44 Significantly, the Court in Bi-Metallic
carefully distinguished Londoner on the ground that it had involved a "relatively
small number of persons
... who were exceptionally affected in each case upon
4
individual grounds.
40 1978-2 TRADE CASEs at 75,966 (quoting 425 F.2d at 591).
41 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
42 Id. at 445.
43 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
44

Id. at 385-86.

45 239 U.S. at 446. See also 359 F.2d at 631, in which the District of Columbia Circuit
found the proceeding before them to be a rulemaking proceeding because it was general in
scope and prospective in operation rather than individual in impact and condemnatory in
purpose.
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The fundamental distinction between rulemaking and adjudication was
later deemed an inadequate basis for deciding what type of hearing to afford
parties involved in rulemaking proceedings:
In many cases, it is unnecessary, and even unwise, to classify a given proceeding as either adjudicatory or rule-making. The line between the two is
frequently a thin one and resolution of a given problem will rarely turn
wholly on whether the proceeding is placed in one category or another.
Moreover, obsession with attempts to place agency action in the proper
category may often obscure the real issue which divides the parties and
requires our resolution.46
Adjudication and rulemaking, especially hybrid rulemaking, have more typically
involved complex intertwinings of adjudicative and legislative elements making
it unrealistic to attempt to retain such a clear distinction between the two types
of agency proceedings.
B. Adjudicative Facts versus Legislative Facts
A more functional distinction for deciding whether to use trial-type procedures in administrative rulemaking has been that between legislative and
adjudicative facts. This distinction was first developed by Professor Davis' and
apparently has roots in the results of Londoner and Bi-Mfetallic. Legislative facts
are ordinarily general and do not concern the immediate parties.48 They involve policy questions which can be resolved only by value decisions which by
nature are not subject to empirical scrutiny."5 Adjudicative facts normally concern the immediate parties involved, their activities, their properties or their
business, and are therefore subject to reasonable dispute."0
The FTCIA illustrates the use of the adjudicative fact distinction to decide
the hybrid rulemaking hearing issue. The Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (FTCIA) illustrates the use of the adjudicative/legislative fact distinction to decide the hybrid rulemaking hearing issue. Under the FTCIA, for example, "an issue for examination including cross-examination, or the presentation
of rebuttal submission,"'" must be an issue of "specific, in contrast to legislative
fact."52 The Administrative Conference of the United States has also recommended that trial-type hearings be employed in rulemaking when "issues of
specific fact" are in dispute. The Conference further suggests that Congress never
require trial-type procedures for resolving "questions of policy or of broad general
fact."53
46
47
48

458 F.2d at 739.
2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03, at 353 (1958).
Id.
49 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1958).
50 According to Professor Davis, "when a court or agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties-who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent-the
court or agency is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called
adjudicative facts." 2 K. DAvis, supra note 47, at 353.
51 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(d) (5) (i) (A) (1977).
52 Id.

53

TION

ADMINISTRATIVE

72-5(3).

CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

supra note 19,

RECOMMENDA-
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Professor Davis has openly advocated the adjudicative/legislative fact
formulation. Although he predicted that the law of the future would follow the
Administrative Conference's recommendation,54 Davis observed that a "good deal
of consternation continues [as to the type of hearing which should be granted]
when fact issues are less broad and less general" than mere policy questions, or
policy questions intertwined with general facts.5" The basic principles, Davis concluded, are yet to be created."
V. Due Process Right to an Impartial Tribunal
In addition to an opportunity for a meaningful hearing, due process requires
that a party charged with violating an agency rule have his case heard by an
impartial tribunal." An examination of the approaches taken by the courts to
determine whether an administrator's lack of impartiality warranted disqualification in adjudicative hearings is an essential step toward resolution of the bias
problem as it has recently surfaced in the hybrid rulemaking realm.
A. Adjudicative/Legislative Fact Distinction
Some courts have relied on the adjudicative/legislative fact distinction to
determine whether an administrator should be disqualified for bias and prejudgment when presiding over cases against specific individuals or entities.
Three types of bias have emerged relative to whether the factual issue involved in
administrative adjudications was adjudicative or legislative: (1) bias as to broad
general policy or legal theory, (2) bias as to understanding and opinion of general or legislative fact, and (3) bias as to specific or adjudicative facts.
1. Bias as to Broad General Policy or Legal Theory
The fundamental nature and operation of the administrative process make
it impossible to expect administrators to be totally free from policy preconceptions. An administrative agency is established by the executive typically to get
things done in the interest of one side that has the control over or the favor of
the legislature for the time being. 8 As Professor Davis has observed, legislative
policies are translated into action through administrators whose honest opinionbiases are favorable to those policies.
Accordingly, "a trade commissioner
should not be neutral in anti-monopoly policies"' and an SEC commissioner
should not be apathetic about the need for government restrictions."1 The
theoretically ideal administrator, in Davis' opinion, "is one whose broad point
of view is in general agreement with the policies he administers but who main54 K. DAVIS,
55 Id.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES

§ 6.01-5, at 190 (1976).

56 Id.
57 See 1978-2 TADE CASEs at 75,966; Friendly, Some Kind of a Hearing, 123 U. PENN.
L. REV.1267, 1279 (1975).
58 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CoMITTEE ON AD. LAW, 63 A.B.A. REP. 331, 342 (1938).
59 K. DAvis, supra note 12, at 247.
60 Id. See 336 F.2d at 767.
61 K. DAvis, supra note 12, at 247.
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tains the sufficient balance to perceive and to avoid the degree of zeal which
substantially impairs fair-mindedness."6 2
The United States Supreme Court has held bias as to broad general policy or
legal theory to be no ground for disqualification. The Supreme Court clearly
expressed this position in FTC v. Cement Institute.6 The FTC initiated proceedings concerning the Cement Institute's multiple basing-point delivered price
system. Prior to the initiation of the proceedings, the Commission had sent
reports both to Congress and to the President expressing its opinion that the
legality of such a pricing system was questionable. The companies involved in the
proceedings contended that, as a result of its initial investigations, the entire
membership of the Commission had concluded that the operation of the multiple
basing-point system was a violation of the Sherman Act. They argued that it
would be a denial of due process for the Commission to act in the proceedings
after having expressed such opinion.
The Supreme Court held that the formation and expression of the opinion
by the Commission did not warrant disqualification, and advanced several
reasons in support of its decision. First, the Court held that "the fact that the
Commission had entertained such views as the result of its prior ex-parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed" 64 and stressed that the parties were still entitled to participate
in the proceedings through oral testimony and cross-examination. Second, the
Court feared that if the Commission's opinions expressed in congressionally
required reports would bar its members from acting in unfair trade proceedings,
opinions expressed in the first basing-point proceeding would disqualify the Commission from ever passing on another.6 The experience acquired from their
work as commissioners would thus be a handicap rather than the advantage
Congress intended it to be.66 Finally, while pointing out that the FTC would not
be under stronger constitutional due process compulsions than a court, the
Supreme Court maintained that it would not be a violation of due process even
for a judge "to sit in a case after he had expressed an opinion as to whether
certain types of conduct were prohibited by law.... 67
In Skelly Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission," the Tenth Circuit relied
on Cement Institute to deny a disqualification request. The substantive dispute in
Skelly arose from an FPC order relating to prices for jurisdictional sales of
natural gas produced in certain basins. Certain of the natural gas producers
affected by the FPC order sought disqualification of two commissioners on the
grounds that each of them had prejudged the issue of whether substantial
competition existed among natural gas producers. The charges stemmed from
public addresses which had been made by the commissioners.
The Tenth Circuit found no basis for disqualification in the "fact or assump62
63
64
65
66
67
68
Basin

Id.
333 U.S. 683 (1948).
Id. at 701.
Id. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
333 U.S. at 702.
Id. at 702-03.
375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967), modified on other grounds sub nom. In Re Permian
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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tion that ... [the] administrative agency enter[ed] a proceeding with advance
views on important economic matters in issue."" In addition, in the absence of
contradictory evidence, the court ultimately relied on the commissioners as "men
of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances."'
In a more recent case, Corning Glass Works v. FTC,"' the Seventh Circuit
adopted a similar position with regard to a commissioner's open expression of
policy opinion. In that case, Coming appealed an FTC order requiring it to
cease and desist from the use of consumer price restriction clauses as applied to
wholesalers in free trade states. Corning challenged the impartiality of the Commission because of its continued opposition to resale price maintenance in general
and to legislative exemptions from antitrust laws for this particular form of price
fixing.
The Seventh Circuit found no merit in Coming's challenge in light of the
administrator's role in carrying legislative policy into action:
It is certainly proper for the Commission to express the consumer point of
view when antitrust amendments, or exemptions, are being considered by
Congress. Its performance of that public service in no way disqualifies its
entitled to our respect in the discharge of
status as an independent agency
72
its quasi-judicial functions.
As the Supreme Court in Cement Institute had been wary of barring the FTC
from further performance on the basis of its policy views, 'the Seventh Circuit
avoided the danger of inhibiting the Commission from future expression of policy
opinion as an important public interest service.
These cases demonstrate that bias regarding general policies by an adjudicator is not violative of due process. Similarly, a showing of bias on legislative facts has not been considered a due process violation.
2. Bias as to General or Legislative Facts
According to Professor Davis, notions of broad policy and legal theory are
often inseparable from impressions of general facts, such as those applying generally to an industry or other recognizable class. Davis, among others, " maintains that "prejudgment of general facts of the kind that merge with points of
view concerning issues of law or policy is probably inevitable and cannot properly
be deemed a ground for disqualification." 4
As shown with respect to policy preconceptions, justification for allowing
bias as to general facts lies in the general nature of an administrator's function.
"Agency members . . . are expected to be experts, bringing to each case a
specialized knowledge formed by experience. Such knowledge and experience is
69 Id. at 18.
70 Id. (quoting 313 U.S. at 421).
71 509 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1975).
72 Id. at 303-04.
73 See, e.g., Koch, Prejudgment: An Unavailable Challenge to Official Administrative
Action, 33 FED. B.J. 218, 219-20 (1974).
74

2 K. DAvis, supra note 47, at 144.
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not, and should not be, confined to the record of a particular case."75 Conscious
or unconscious retrieving of knowledge, or general facts gained through investigations in prior proceedings involving particular parties for use in a later
proceeding involving those same parties, therefore, does not constitute prejudgment.7
3. Bias as to Adjudicative Facts
Although strong convictions or points of view on questions of law, policy,
or general facts have not been held to be grounds for disqualification in agency
adjudications, several cases stand for the proposition that preconceptions as to
specific or adjudicative facts in a particular case are grounds for disqualification.
Texaco, Inc. v. FTC77 demonstrates judicial disfavor of bias as to specific
facts. In Texaco, the FTC charged Texaco and B.F. Goodrich with engaging
in unfair methods of competition regarding arrangements for promoting the
sale of Goodrich products through Texaco dealers. While the proceeding was
pending, FTC Chairman Dixon delivered a speech to the National Congress of
Petroleum Retailers in which he openly stated that Texaco and Goodrich had
engaged in unfair competitive practices as alleged in the complaint which had
been filed against them. Texaco sought to disqualify Dixon because the speech
evinced bias or prejudgment of the facts of the pending action.
The District of Columbia Circuit found that Dixon had prejudged specific
issues involved in the case. Dixon's speech indicated that he had already concluded that Texaco and Goodrich were violating the Act and that he would
protect the petroleum retailers from such abuses. The court concluded that "a
disinterested reader of Chairman Dixon's speech could hardly fail to conclude
that he had in some measure decided in advance that Texaco had violated the
Act."" 8 Accordingly, Dixon's participation constituted a denial of due process.
Similarly, in American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC,79 the Sixth Circuit disqualified
Commissioner Dixon for prejudgment of facts in an action charging certain drug
companies with unfair methods of competition in the production and sale of
tetracycline. The companies alleged that Dixon, while serving in his former
capacity as Chief Counsel in a congressional investigation of the drug industry,
had investigated many of the same facts at issue in the case then pending against
the drug companies. In a report prepared by Dixon and his staff in connection
with those investigations, Dixon condemned the named drug companies for the
same anticompetitive practices.
In response to motions filed by the drug companies, the Sixth Circuit disqualified Dixon from participation in the determination of those factual issues
pertaining to the alleged anticompetitive behavior. Significantly, the court's
decision was based, not on Dixon's prior investigation of general issues, but on

75
76
77
78
79

Elman, A Note on Administrative Adjudication, 74 YALE L.J. 652, 653 (1965).
Koch, supra note 73, at 220.
336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Id. at 760.
363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
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the depth of the investigation into specific facts which ultimately arose in the
commission proceedings pending against the companies.8"
B. Institutional versus Personal Bias
Although the foregoing cases suggest an apparent judicial sensitivity to
charges of bias and prejudgment as to specific facts, other cases support the
proposition that the key distinction involved in agency adjudication is whether
the bias or prejudgment is institutionalor personal. When the spectre of bias has
arisen in the context of an institutional process, courts have refused to disqualify
an agency or its individual members. Instead, those courts have preferred to rely
on the integrity and objectivity of the agency officials who were acting in their
administrative capacity. If evidence of personal bias on the part of individual
agency members existed, however, some courts have closely scrutinized decisions
rendered by those officials.8"
In Berkshire Employees Association v. NLRB,82 the Third Circuit laid the
foundation for the institutional/personal bias distinction. In Berkshire, an individual NLRB member had written a personal letter to a customer of the Berkshire Employees Association, which Berkshire interpreted as a solicitation of help
in a union boycott. Although the court recognized that certain duties of an administrative body necessitate prejudgment of some issues of an adjudication, it
refused to condone participation by the individual member who had already
personally "thrown his weight on the other side."8
Following the Third Circuit's decision in Berkshire, the District of Columbia
Circuit, in Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,"4 refused
to allow participation by a member of the SEC who had previously participated
in the same case on the side of one of the parties involved. The individual member
of the SEC had been responsible to the SEC for the initiation, conduct and
supervision of the proceedings at issue while formerly serving as a member of the
Commission's Division of Finance. The Court found that the potential for prejudgment was too great when the prejudicial information was derived from the
Commissioner's prior prosecutorial role, rather than from his role as administrative judge. The court thus held that participation by that individual was contrary to the due process requirement that an administrative hearing be attended
"'not only with every element of fairness but with the very appearance of complete
fairness." 5
In both Berkshire and Amos Treat, the bias and prejudgment of the disqualified agency members were traceable to ex parte sources. In NLRB v. Donnelly Co.,8" however, the Supreme Court defended the integrity of an individual
80 See also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1966), in which
knowledge as to general facts gained through investigations prior to proceedings was not a basis
for disqualification.
81 K. DAvis, supra note 12, at 245.
82 121 F.2d 235 (3rd Cir. 1941).
83 Id. at 239.
84 306 F.2d 260 (D.C.Cir. 1962).
85 Id. at 267.
86 330 U.S. 219 (1947).
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agency member whose alleged bias arose in connection with his activities as
NLRB Commissioner.
In Donnelly, a hearing examiner recommended findings of fact after excluding certain testimony in an initial hearing. Upon review, the case was returned
to the same examiner who, after hearing the testimony, found as he had previously. The court of appeals concluded that the examiner should not preside
again because of possible prejudgment of the facts." The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Eighth Circuit, thereby upholding the examiner's decision
and rejecting the challenge of illegal prejudgment. The Court in Donnelly thus
chose to rely on the integrity of the agency official performing in his institutional
capacity.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court, in FTC v. Cement Institute,8
refused to bar the entire FTC from hearing a case which was factually related to
opinions expressed by the Commission in a report on the cement industry which
it had submitted to Congress. Although the Court's refusal to disqualify the
commissioner was explained in terms of policy bias, the Court's remarks indicated
a reluctance to interfere with the agency's institutional function:
If the Commission's opinions expressed in Congressionally required reports
would bar its members from acting in unfair trade proceedings, it would
appear that opinions expressed in the first basing point unfair trade proceeding would similarly disqualify them from ever passing on another .... Thus
experience acquired from their work as Commissioners would be a handicap
instead of an advantage. Such was not the intendment of Congress. 9
The First Circuit displayed a similar reluctance to interfere with congressionally intended administrative functions in Pangburnv. Civil Aviation Board."
The Civil Aviation Board (CAB) had affirmed an order of the Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Agency suspending a pilot's license for ninety days after
finding that he had negligently operated an aircraft in scheduled air transportation. The CAB had publicly committed itself to a finding of the pilot's error in an
accident investigation report submitted prior to the conclusion of the license suspension proceeding. The pilot claimed a denial of due process on the ground that
the CAB had prejudged the very issue involved in the adjudication. In addition,
he sought to distinguish cases like Cement Institute from his own on the ground
that in those cases the "finding related to general law and policy ... and not to a
concrete and specific factual determination.""
Despite the pilot's arguments, the First Circuit concluded that "the mere
fact that a tribunal has had contact with a particular factual complex in a prior
hearing, or indeed has taken a public position on the facts, is [insufficient] to
place that tribunal under a constitutional inhibition to pass upon the facts in a
subsequent hearing.""2 The court felt this was true particularly since the agency's
87
88
89
90
91
92

151 F.2d 854, 870 (8th Cir. 1945).
See text accompanying note 63 supra.
333 U.S. at 702.
311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 358.
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contact with the case resulted from having followed the congressional mandate
to investigate and report the probable cause of all civil air accidents.93 Irrespective of the type of factual issues involved, the court preferred to protect the CAB
while functioning within its institutional bounds at the risk of denying the pilot
his right to an impartial tribunal.
As seen in the foregoing cases, an administrator acting as an adjudicator has
been disqualified for personal bias and for bias as to adjudicative facts. In
NationalAdvertisers, the district court disqualified Chairman Pertschuk primarily
to protect the participants' right to an objective rulemaking hearing. A necessary
inquiry, therefore, is whether disqualification for personal bias or bias as to
adjudicative facts is also necessary in hybrid rulemaking proceedings to protect
the affected parties' right to a fair hearing.
VI. Due Process and Bias in Hybrid Rulemaking
The district court in National Advertisers ruled that, as a matter of fundamental due process, the participants in the Children's Advertising rulemaking
proceedings were entitled to a determination of factual issues by a disinterested,
objective tribunal." On the basis of the facts and circumstances presented by the
plaintiffs, the court concluded that the risk of unfairness in allowing Commissioner Pertschuk to participate in the rulemaking was "intolerably high" and thus
due process demanded his disqualification.
Although the court seemed firm in its finding of an intolerably high risk of
unfairness, it offered only vague and conclusory statements in support of such a
finding:
Upon examination of the Chairman's public statements, a very substantial
showing has been made that the Chairman has conclusively prejudged
factual issues which will be disputed in the rulemaking and whose resolution
will be necessary for a fair determination of the rulemaking as a whole....,
Going far beyond general observations of policy and tentative statements of
attitude, the Chairman has by his use of conclusory statements of fact, his
emotional use of derogatory terms and characterization, and his affirmative
efforts to propagate his settled views made his further participation improper.95
Regardless whether the court's decision to disqualify Commissioner Pertschuk was a sound one, National Advertisers represents novel precedential support
for disqualification in hybrid rulemaking which is likely to initiate a flood of disqualification motions in subsequent agency proceedings.9" The court's memorandum in support of its decision, however, provides minimal guidelines or standards for coping with such charges of bias and prejudgment and motions for dis93 Id.
94 1978-2 TADE CASES at 75,967.
95 Id. at 75,966.
96 A trucking group has already requested Daniel O'Neal, Chairman of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, to disqualify himself from proceedings involving the proposed elimination of trucking rules. The group, Assure Competitive Transportation (ACT), has focused on
Mr. O'Neal's expression of support for reducing trucking regulations that the industry wants
preserved. National L. J., Feb. 26, 1979, at 7.
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qualification in hybrid rulemaking. It neglects to mention specifically what public
statements and what factual issues it was referring to as endangering the fairness
of the rulemaking as a whole. Further, the court does not elaborate on its approach for determining that the bias was inappropriate.
In the absence of guidance from the court, uncertainty remains whether
the problem of bias in hybrid rulemaking can be resolved in terms of the adjudicative/legislative fact distinction or perhaps in terms of the institutional/
personal bias distinction. Perhaps neither of these approaches, which have been
deemed proper bases for deciding either the due process hearing issue in hybrid
rulemaking or the bias issue in adjudication can also serve as proper bases for
deciding bias and prejudgment claims in the unique context of hybrid rulemaking. Accordingly, an important issue is to determine how the unique nature
of hybrid rulemaking bears on the proper means for determining what constitutes
inappropriate bias.
A. Adjudicative/Legislative Fact Approach
Since hybrid rulemaking procedures typically possess characteristics of both
iulemaking and adjudication, the problem of bias and prejudgment of factual
issues in such proceedings arguably lends itself to an analysis grounded on Davis'
adjudicative/legislative fact distinction. When employed for purposes of determining whether a trial-type hearing should be allowed, this distinction led to a
general conclusion that a hearing was necessary for resolution of adjudicative
facts. When applied to the bias problem in adjudicative proceedings, the conclu-.
sion seems to have been that bias or prejudgment of broad policy or general facts
was not a ground for disqualification, while bias or prejudgment of specific or
adjudicative facts did merit disqualification. Before concluding, however, that
an analysis of the type of factual issues involved is a useful means for ruling on a
charge of bias in hybrid rulemaking procedures, several drawbacks of the fact
distinction approach merit consideration.
Guidelines and criteria for determining whether a fact is adjudicative or
legislative have not been well developed. Even cases which have based their
decision on the fact distinction have referred to the distinction only in a vague
and conclusory manner. 7
Legislative facts, in their purest state, are general in nature, do not directly
concern the immediate parties, and aid administrators in deciding questions of
law, policy and discretion. 8 In both rulemaking and adjudication, disputed
issues of legislative fact can be resolved by using judgment, without additional
procedural safeguards such as oral argument, right of rebuttal, and cross-examination.
As one critic has observed, however, legislative facts involved in rulemaking
are not always in a pure state.99 Such legislative facts frequently are based on
other factual predicates, some of which may be of an adjudicative nature and
97 See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Walter Holm & Co. v. Harding, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
98 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 49, at 413.
99 Kastenbaum, supra note 20, at 691.

Cir. 1973);
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therefore subject to dispute. Acknowledging that an issue involves policy or
legislative fact, therefore, may be inadequate for answering such crucial questions whether a trial-type hearing is required to resolve those facts' ° or whether
an agency official's bias as to those facts necessitates disqualifying the official in
order to protect the due process right of rulemaking participants.
The adjudicative/legislative fact distinction may prove to be even less
valuable for answering the hearing and bias questions in hybrid rulemaking than
in pure legislative rulemaking. The combination of adjudication and rulemaking
characteristics in the administrative procedure is likely to lead to a more complex
relation between legislative and adjudicative facts.
The ambiguity and confusion involved in the determination of adjudicative,
or "specific," facts in FTC hybrid proceedings exemplifies one of the fundamental
weaknesses of the adjudicative/legislative fact distinction as a useful approach to
the due process hearing question. In order to be granted the right to crossexamination under the FTCIA, the "issue for examination including cross-examination, or the presentation of rebuttal submissions [must be] an issue of specific,
in contrast to legislative fact."'' As in prior court decisions referring to the
adjudicative/legislative fact distinction, no definitions or explanation of the
terms "adjudicative" or "legislative" fact is provided in the text of the FTCIA.
Nor does the factual distinction become clear from the actual operation of the
FTC hybrid proceedings to date.
Under the FTCIA, it is within the discretion of the Commission, or the
presiding officer, to determine the disputed issues of material fact for which the
trial-type procedures of cross-examination and rebuttal will be allowed. The
process by which the Commission decides these critical specific issues provides
little disclosure of the Commission's reasons for having determined certain issues
to be specific.
In its initial notice of the proposed rulemaking, the Commission may refer
to materials, such as information derived from extensive staff investigations,
which prompted the initiation of the proceedings. The notice is usually followed
by a general release of the staff report containing the basis for the staff recommendation. The Commission often refrains from expressing its views of the staff
reports, thus further hindering an understanding of how it derived the specific
facts. In addition, the Commission often disclaims any prejudgment in favor of
the staff position. 2
Also, in its initial notice, the Commission elicits comments on questions it
proposes concerning possible remedial provisions and the prevalence and unfairness of the practice at issue.' The Commission typically maintains that the
100 Kastenbaum, supra note 20, at 691-92. See also Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure
Reform, 118 U. PENN. L. REv. 485, 521 (1971).
101 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(d) (5) (i)(A) (1977).
102 See, e.g., Proposed Trade Reg. § 438, Proprietary Vocational and Home Study
Schools, 40 Fed. Reg. 21052 (1975), in which the FTC stated, as it had in each initial notice,
that it had "not adopted any findings or conclusions of the staff" and that "[a]ll the findings in
[the] proceedings [would be] based solely on the matter in the rulemaking record."
103 See, e.g., Proposed Trade Reg. § 67, Children'sAdvertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,96970 (1978).
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questions posed are not an indication of which issues it will determine as warranting trial-type procedures."'
As a consequence of the ambiguity surrounding the determination of critical
specific issues in FTC rulemaking, attorneys for interested parties often have
blindly submitted any and every possible issue in cross-examination requests. 05
Presiding officers thus have become totally confused in ascertaining which of the
proposed issues merit trial-type hearings."' Ultimately, the issues which have
been designated as critical specific issues have not been logically distinguishable
from those which were not chosen. The distinction between specific and legislative facts under FTCIA, then, has lost all meaning.
Resolution of the problem of bias in FTC hybrid rulemaking would be a
simple matter if it were possible to maintain that bias as to specific facts automatically merits disqualification while bias as to legislative facts does not. As
shown above, however, the specific/legislative fact distinction breaks down in
the actual process. Specific facts are often indistinguishable from legislative facts,
making it nearly impossible to determine which facts a rulemaker actually had
prejudged. Moreover, the threat of such automatic disqualification by the courts
may prompt the Commission to refrain from identifying as specific facts any
facts as to which it may have exhibited bias or prejudgment.
Judicial scrutiny of the types of issues specified by the Commission as eligible
for trial-type hearings might be a means of offsetting the possibility that the
Commission will abuse its discretion to determine the specific issues in order to
camouflage bias. In other words, upon submission of a motion for disqualification, a reviewing court might be permitted to make its own determination of
what, in its opinion, should have been designated as critical specific issues.
Authorizing a court to make such a determination, however, would undoubtedly
encounter fundamental obstacles. First, with no established guidelines for determination of "specific facts," the courts would be free to develop their own
concepts, which could differ from court to court as well as with the Commission's
concepts. Second, the courts would be interfering with the discretion statutorily
granted to the Commission. Under general administrative principles, only a clear
abuse of agency discretion warrants such interference.117 Third, the timing of the
judicial intervention would be a sensitive matter. Premature judicial interference
in the rulemaking process would inevitably hinder effective rulemaking operations.' Finally, since there is such a wide variety of hybrid procedures, the utility
of combining the adjudicative/legislative fact distinction with a judicial review
mechanism may be limited solely to FTC procedures.
104 A typical statement in this regard is likely to read as follows: "Neither the statement of
factual premises nor the questions should be interpreted as designating disputed issues of specific
fact ....
[S]uch designation shall he made by the Commission or its duly authorized presiding
official pursuant to the Commission's procedures and rules of practice." See Proprietary Vocational and Home Study Schools, supra note 102.
105 Id.
106 Kastenbaum, supra note 20, at 698.
107 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
108 The movants in National Advertisers did not have to await final promulgation of the
rule. The district court ordered Chairman Pertschuk's disqualification even before the FTC
had determined the disputed issues of critical fact. See note 8 supra. The propriety and wisdom of such early intervention are questionable.
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B. Institutionalversus Personal Bias
As shown above, the adjudicative/legislative fact distinction is not an
adequate basis for coping with the problem of bias in hybrid rulemaking. The
possibility remains, however, that the institutional/personal bias distinction as
used to analyze the problem of bias and prejudice in administrative adjudications
might serve as an alternative means for dealing with bias and prejudgment in
unique hybrid rulemaking.
In United States v. Morgan,'0 9 the Supreme Court declared that, without a
showing to the contrary, state administrators "are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy
Likewise, judgment exercised by
fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.""'
Professor Davis' "Ideal Administrator" in his fact-finding function "would be
guided by intellectual perception, not by emotion" and would call upon his
integrity, character and ability."'
Several cases previously discussed in which courts have denied requests for
disqualification suggest that courts also have relied on the integrity of the agency
and its individual members to do the right thing when performing in an adjudicative capacity." 2 The fundamental nature of the fact-finding process in agency
rulemaking, however, seems to demand a much greater reliance on the integrity
of the administrator than is ever likely to be required in agency adjudication.
In some respects, the process of developing factual support for a proposed
rule'appears much like the process of gathering evidence in adjudications. Testi,
mony will be presented in the form of raw perceptions from which the agency
must draw certain inferences and reach a conclusion which implicitly involves
some judgment on the agency's part.
At some point, however, the intellectual process involved in rulemaking
diverges from that involved in adjudication. At a certain stage of any rulemaking
proceeding, "the agency members inescapably doff their hats as value-neutral
fact-finders and assume the role of legislators of values.""' By contrast, an adjudicator is theoretically committed to applying a rule of law to the facts in a
value-free way.
Rulemaking is a valuable and important administrative technique for evolution of general policy, "notwithstanding or perhaps because of, the freedom from
the procedures carefully prescribed to assure fairness in individual adjudication.""' The rulemaker's freedom to legislate values is enhanced by his ability to
take outside information into consideration in formulating a final rule. The
109 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
110 Id. at 421.
111 K. DAvis, supra note 12, at 247. See text accompanying note 62.
112 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); NLRB v. Donnelly Co., 330 U.S. 219
(1947); Pangburn v. Civil Aviation Board, 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962). See also Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 80 (10th Cir. 1972) and FTC v. Cinderella Career and
Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1968), in which the courts of appeals
upheld the right of agencies to communicate information pursuant to their public interest
function.
113 Williams, Hybrid Rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 42 U. Cm. L. Rav. 401, 405 n.21 (1975).
114 359 F.2d at 630.
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Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the need, in rulemaking proceedings, to
gather general facts from sources beyond the particular record, including information and expertise gained by agency officials through prior investigations:
[An agency] is not confined to the record of a particular proceeding. "Cumulative experience" begets understanding and insight by which judgments not
objectively demonstrable are validated or qualified or invalidated. The
constant process of trial and error, on a wider and fuller scale than a single
adversary litigation permits, differentiates perhaps more than anything else
the administrative from the judicial process. 115
The complexity of factors and information incorporated into the formulation of
an agency rule, especially in the hybrid rulemaking process, therefore, might lead
to an even greater reluctance to probe the mind of an allegedly biased agency or
its members as rulemakers than there has been with respect to an agency and its
members as adjudicators.
From the previous examination of the FTC hybrid procedure, 1 6 clearly the
amount of discretion granted to the Commission has enabled it to retain considerable control over the adjudicative as well as the rulemaking aspects of the hybrid
procedure. The due process concern which forced the promulgation of hybrid
procedures thus has not been sufficient to destroy the essentially independent
nature of administrative rulemaking. A charge of bias on the part of an agency
rulemaker involves a similar struggle between fairness and the institution of
rulemaking. As seems true with respect to the trial-type hearing controversy,
rulemaking institutions and their members may prevail. The result in ANA,
however, suggests the possibility that a court's concern for fairness in rulemaking
hearings may prevail over integrity, thus raising doubt as to the extent to which
reliance on the integrity and objectivity of rulemakers will continue as a possible
protection from disqualification in rulemaking.
As seen from the foregoing discussion, the adjudicative/legislative factual
issue distinction falls short of providing an effective means for dealing with the
problem of bias in the hybrid rulemaking context. Precisely what constitutes
specific as opposed to legislative facts has not been well established.' 17 Professor
Davis himself has recognized the existence of a "borderland" area between these
broad categories where the distinction often has little or no utility." The utility
of the institutional/personal bias distinction has also become questionable in
light of evidence from the ANA case that reliance on the integrity and objectivity of rulemakers may ultimately be outweighed by the increasing concern
115 NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953). See also 333 U.S. at 702, in which
the Supreme Court refused to disqualify the FTC so as to avoid making the expertise acquired
by the Commission a handicap rather than an advantage.
116 See text accompanying notes 101-08.
117 According to Judge Friendly, "mhe classifying test-that adjudicative facts are 'intrinsically the kind of facts that ordinarily ought not to be determined without giving the parties a
chance to know and to meet any evidence that may be unfavorable to them,' is somewhat
circular and not always satisfactory." Friendly, supra note 57, at 1268 n.6 (quoting, in part,
K. DAvs, supra note 49, at 413). See also Nathanson, Book Review, 70 YALE L.J. 1210, 1211
(1961).
118 1 K. DAvis, supra note 49, at 414. See, e.g., Petition of New York Water Serv. Corp.,
283 N.Y. 23, 27 N.E.2d 221 (1940).

[Vol. 54:886]

NOTES

over administrative due process. The need for alternative means for coping with
the bias problem is evident. The best alternative at present is that which focuses
on the nature of the interests of the parties who stand to be affected by the
proposed rules.
C. Nature of the Interests Involved -A

Case-by-Case Approach

For purposes of determining generally what procedural safeguards must
be imposed in administrative proceedings in order to satisfy due process requirements, Judge Friendly has recommended a balancing approach: "The required
degree of procedural safeguards varies with the importance of the private interest
affected and the need for and usefulness of the particular safeguard in the given
circumstances and inversely with the burden and any other adverse consequences
of affording it.""" Although stated in general terms, this balancing approach has
particular application to the current due process concern over bias in rulemaking.
Judge Friendly's emphasis on the "importance of the private interest
affected" suggests .a return to the Londoner - Bi-Metallic criterion previously used
In Bi-Metallic,
for purposes of distinguishing adjudication from rulemaking.'
the Supreme Court found no due process right to a hearing for an across-theboard land valuation increase. In Londoner, on the other hand, the Court had
held that due process required that the individual property owners be granted
the right to a hearing before special property taxes could be assessed against them,
The Court distinguished the two cases on the ground that in Londoner a rela.
tively small number of persons were exceptionally affected in each case upon
individualgrounds."'
The distinction between adjudication and rulemaking as derived from
Londoner and Bi-Metallic has lost true meaning, particularly in light of the
mixture of adjudicative and rulemaking characteristics in hybrid rulemaking.
These two cases are valuable for purposes of the present discussion, however, to
the extent that they focused on both the number of persons involved and the
effect the proceedings could have on those persons. In that respect, they lend
support to Judge Friendly's balancing approach to due process questions.
Authority exists to support Judge Friendly's proposal for transcending the
adjudicative/legislative fact distinction or any other such artificial distinctions.
A focus on the importance of the interests involved can be seen in discussions
relating to the hearing issue as it arose during the development of the hybrid
rulemaking procedures. For instance, in 1972, the Administrative Conference
recommended that trial-type procedures be used only "on issues of specific fact"
22
and never ... for resolving questions of policy or of broad or general fact."'
The 1976 Conference, however, added that an agency should permit crossexamination "only to the extent that it believes that anticipated costs, such as
those related to additional time and resources needed, are offset by anticipated
gains in the quality of the rule and the extent to which the rulemaking will be
119 Friendly, supra note 57, at 1278.
120 See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
121 239 U.S. at 446.
122

See note 53 supra.
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perceived as having been fair."' 3 Professor Davis similarly recognized that while
"[d]ebatable and critical legislative facts probably need not always be brought
into the record, [they] . . . should be subject to challenge through briefs and

arguments," and "the tribunal should have the discretionary power to determine
whether cross-examination is appropriate in the circumstances."124
Although the rules accompanying the FTCIA call for cross-examination only
for specific, as contrasted with legislative, facts,2 5 the Senate report accompanying
the Act leaves room for providing an opportunity for presentation and rebuttal
evidence and cross-examination if "affected persons . . . challenge the factual

assumptions on which the Commission is proceeding and show in what respect
such assumptions are erroneous."' 2 6
The District of Columbia Circuit took a similar approach in American
Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board."7 In that case, the court of appeals
concluded that the disputed issue was one of broad or general fact, involving
expert opinions and forecasts, which could not be decisively resolved by testimony.'28 The court did not base its denial of the request for an opportunity for
oral presentation and cross-examination on the nature of the issue involved.
Rather, the court focused on the circumstances of the particular case and the
particular parties: "Nowhere in the record is there any specific proffer by
petitioners as to the subjects they believed required oral hearings, what kind of
facts they proposed to adduce, and by what witness, etc. Nor was there any
specific proffer as to particular lines of cross-examination. . . .""' The court's

language seems to indicate that if the petitioners had specifically demonstrated
why they were entitled to a hearing that it would have been granted.
Similarly, in the Long Island Railroad Co. v. United States,.3 Judge
Friendly refused to grant the railroad company an oral hearing on matters
described as involving broad or general fact. He noted, however, that the court,
nonetheless, might have imposed additional procedural safeguards if "Long
Island had pointed to specifics on which it needed to cross-examine or present
live rebuttal testimony . . . to enable it to mount a more effective argument

against the Commission proposal."'' In the absence of such evidence, however,
the railroad failed to demonstrate a denial of its due process right to full and
fair disclosure and an opportunity to be heard.
In International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,"' Judge Levanthal expressly alluded to a more individual, case-by-case approach to the hearing question, stating that a "right of cross-examination, consistent with time limitations,
might well extend to particularcases of need, on critical points where the general
123 COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OP THE UNITED
STATES PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION 76-3, PROCEDURES IN ADDITION TO NOTICE AND THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR COMMENT IN INFORMAL RULEMAKING 4 (May 10, 1976).
124
2 K. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 432 (emphasis added).
125
126
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128
129
130
131

132

16 C.F.R. § 1.13(d) (5) (i) (A) (1977).
S. REP. No. 1408, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
7765.
359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
Id. at 633.
Id.
318 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
Id. at 499.

478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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procedure proved inadequate to probe 'soft' and sensitive subjects and wit13
nesses.""
The hybrid rulemaking procedures prescribed by the Consumer Product
Safety Act implicitly recognize the value in Judge Friendly's focus on the importance of the private interests affected. The Act requires the Commission to
make appropriate findings with respect to: (1) the degree and nature of the
risk of injury the rule is designed to eliminate or reduce; (2) the approximate
number of consumer products, or types or classes thereof subject to it; (3) the
need of the public for the consumer products and the probable effect the rule
will have upon their utility, cost or availability to meet the consumer need; and
(4) any means, consistent with the public health and safety, of achieving the
objective of the rule while minimizing adverse effects on competition and disruption or dislocation of manufacturing or other commercial practices. 34 In
addition, the Act sets forth standards for guiding the Commission, which prevent
the Commission from promulgating a rule unless it finds that: (1) the rule is
reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with the product and is in the public interest; and (2) if the rule bans a
hazardous product, no feasible safety standard would adequately protect the
public from the unreasonable risk of injury associated with the product." 5
Consideration of the weaknesses inherent in both the adjudicative/legislative fact distinction and the institutional/personal bias distinction suggests that a
case-by-case approach, focusing on the nature of the interests at stake, is a more
practical approach to the problem of bias in hybrid rulemaking. According to
cases such as Londoner, American Airlines, Long Island Railroad, and International Harvester, if an interested party presents evidence of potential bias
sufficient to demonstrate a real threat to due process, a court should grant that
party's disqualification request.
VII. Conclusion
In National Advertisers, the District Court for the District of Columbia
ordered that FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk be disqualified from participation in the Children's Television Advertising rulemaking proceeding. Chairman
Pertschuk's disqualification was the first such disqualification of an administrator
performing in a rulemaking role.
The district court based its decision to disqualify Chairman Pertschuk on
the need to protect the participants' due process right to a fair rulemaking
hearing. Although the right to a fair hearing is essential to fundamental administrative due process, the nature of that right arguably varies according to the
nature of the administrative proceeding involved. The FTC rulemaking proceeding involved in National Advertisers was a hybrid proceeding which uniquely
combined elements of both administrative rulemaking and administrative adjudication. The district court, however, emphasized only the adjudicative elements
of the hybrid proceeding. To ensure that the participants received a fair rule133 Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
134 15 U.S.C. §§ 2058(c)(1)(A)-(D) (1976).
135 Id. at §§ 2058(c) (2) (A)-(C).
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making hearing, the court imposed the same standard of impartiality and neutrality on Chairman Pertschuk as that imposed on administrative adjudicators.
By ignoring the rulemaking characteristics of the hybrid proceeding, the
court failed to consider the need for efficiency in the rulemaking process. Efficiency is essential to the operation of the administrative rulemaking process as
an effective means for establishing agency policies." 6 In order to determine
what constitutes inappropriate bias and prejudgment in hybrid rulemaking,
therefore, the need for fairness must be balanced against this competing need
for efficiency.
The district court offered minimal guidelines and standards for coping with
charges of bias and prejudgement in the unique hybrid rulemaking context.
Other courts likewise have failed to develop a useful approach specifically for
dealing with charges of bias in the hybrid context. As seen from the foregoing
discussion, the adjudicative/legislative fact distinction fails to serve as an adequate basis for determining what constitutes inappropriate bias in hybrid rulemaking."' In addition, uncertainty remains whether courts will continue to
accept the heavy reliance on the integrity of administrators, which reliance
underlies the institutional/personal bias distinctions. 3 ' The most practical alternative at present is for courts to examine the nature of the interests involved on
a case-by-case basis to determine whether an allegation of bias and prejudgment
in a hybrid procedure warrants disqualification. This approach allows sufficient
room for the balancing of the competing needs for fairness and efficiency in the
unique hybrid rulemaking context.
Bernadette Muller

136
137
138

See discussion accompanying notes 109-17 supra.
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